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Jimmy Breslin, the Pulitzer Prize winning author, once said of the American presidency
that it is a “bastardized thing, half royalty and half democracy.” The presidency that emerged
from the Constitutional Convention was specifically designed to be an executive office capable
of protecting the state and the Constitution, capable of checking the powers of the legislature and
judiciary, and at the same time face checks to its own power that prevent the office from
usurping unwarranted authority or becoming a tyranny. While the presidency is a limited
executive, the nature of the office, in particular its role as Commander-in-Chief, allow it
extraordinary flexibility in increasing its power. The framers of the Constitution deserve to be
lauded for their foresight; no man to ever hold the office has been able to establish a tyranny or
transform the United States into an authoritarian state. Nevertheless, the office of the presidency
today would seem remarkably different to the framers than their design intended. During the 20th
century the American presidency underwent a period of expansion in terms of both its
political/governing power and the public’s concept of its proper role. Especially in regards to the
conduct of foreign affairs and military operations, the Commander-in-Chief now enjoys powers
that would make statesmen tremble during the early years of the American republic. This
imperial presidency is not an absolute monarchy, nor is it a dictatorship. Instead, the imperial
presidency is an appropriation by the executive of powers reserved by the Constitution and
historical practice to Congress, receiving its impetus to do so from foreign policy and warmaking power.1
What circumstances and events cultivated such a growth in presidential power, and what
have been its enduring effects on American foreign relations? Two major factors shaped the
emergence of the modern “imperial” presidency. The first is the success of the FDR presidency
in demonstrating the potential of active and energetic administration and in undergoing an
1
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extensive expansion of the federal government around the executive. The second factor is the
emergence of the United States as a superpower following World War II and its role as the
champion of the capitalist world during the Cold War. These factors combined helped create the
imperial presidency, which enjoys enhanced prestige and authority over the federal government,
and which in regards to foreign policy has been marked by an expansion of executive war power
and unilateral, interventionist actions across the globe in pursuit of national security and
economic interests.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt revolutionized both the office of the presidency and the
scope and size of the federal government. Roosevelt’s tenure in office heightened the American
public’s expectations of how active an administration should be and broadened the public’s
notions of the legitimate role of the federal government. Facing the crisis of the Great
Depression, Roosevelt was able to repudiate the governing commitments of the previous
Republican-dominated regime. During these years the office was transformed as the president
became a major political actor in the legislative process, a role not associated previously with the
office. With extensive warrants for his presidential authority, FDR was able to wield the
disruptive powers of the office in such a way as to create a new governing coalition and
transform the federal governments’ commitments to the American people. The transformation of
the federal government occurred largely through the New Deal and through the creation of the
Executive Office of the President. The New Deal created new institutions and extended services
to organized labor, small businesses, the poor, the unemployed and the elderly. These types of
reform permanently changed the dynamics of what American citizens expect their federal
government to provide for them. In order to meet and manage the administrative demands
brought about by this expansion of federal oversight, the “President needs help” as the
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Brownlow Committee of 1936 wrote in its famous report on administrative management.2 This
report led to the establishment of the Executive Office of the President, which gave the
presidency “new authority to control the vastly expanded federal bureaucracy and for new
executive offices to provide planning and direction for governmental operations.”3 These
reconstructions of the federal government and its commitments were centered on an expanded
executive branch and thus increased the president’s authority in domestic affairs and in
managing the various executive agencies and departments.
As stated earlier the structural, institutional side of the presidency was not the only aspect
of the office to be revolutionized during FDR’s administration, President Roosevelt was equally
successful in a rhetorical modernization of the presidency. Roosevelt ran for office during a
Great Depression that had exposed the vulnerability of the established governing coalition. This
gave Roosevelt tremendous authority for repudiation and thus as president allowed him to enjoy
tremendous public prestige. FDR altered the dynamic of the president’s rhetorical role by
communicating directly with the American public on matters of policy and legislation. Similar
strategies had been employed before by presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson, but never on the grand-scale of FDR, who had the advantage of being able to utilize the
newly developed radio in his famous “Fireside chats” with American citizens. Following the
FDR years, the American people expected their presidents to be active in communicating policy
matters to the public and to take the lead in pushing for new legislation. The President as
legislator is a role of the office that marks a departure from 19th century presidents. Essentially,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s extraordinary term in office (he is the only president elected
more than twice) witnessed a decisive revolution within the federal government. After his term
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in office not only was the federal government’s governing role expanded vastly, but within the
federal government itself the balance of power was shifted decisively towards the executive
branch. This executive branch was itself enlarged on an unprecedented scale and was brought
increasingly under the control of the presidency.
The year is now 1945. The United States has just undergone a transformative period in its
history. First, the federal government and its governing commitments were enlarged on an
unprecedented scale. Next, in order to meet the administrative demands created by the expansion
of the role of the federal government, the executive branch was expanded and the president
granted increased authority to manage the various agencies. Additionally, the United States and
its allies emerged victorious from World War II, which leaves the United States and the Soviet
Union as the world’s only two superpowers. Previously in its history the United States was
traditionally isolationist and evasive of international affairs, especially those regarding Europe.
After World War II, the United States stands as the world’s leading industrial and military power
– an unprecedented and unforeseen role for the democratic republic. The government of the
United States is now able to determine events in other continents and other corners of the glove.
The context of the Cold War is alarming the U.S. government which sees a growing international
Communist menace, led by the Soviet Union, which has already conquered China and is
threatening to swallow up the rest of continental Europe, Korea, and other regions such as
Southeast Asia and Latin America. As the only democratic and capitalist superpower on the
planet, the U.S., whether it wills it or not, finds itself placed into the role of defender of the free
or capitalist world. This Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union means that
America needs to be prepared to have a rapid military response against threats to her national
security and economic interests around the world. Even the casual reader can foresee what this
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means for the government of the United States. The Great Depression and World War II already
enhanced the powers of the presidency and what the public deemed its proper governing role.
Now, without a pause the United States transitions from the Depression-WWII era into the Cold
War era. Given the aforementioned context of a tenuous, hostile relationship between the USSR
and the U.S. in which a war could break out over seemingly any international disagreement, it is
not difficult to foresee the U.S. presidency taking the helm in setting foreign policy during the
Cold War years.
The implications and consequences of the Cold War for the American presidency are farreaching and just as transformative as the events of the Great Depression. Whereas the
Depression had served as a catalyst for enhancing the president’s public prestige and domestic
governing role, the Cold War will enhance the president’s authority in foreign policy and serve
as a catalyst for executive usurpation of increased war powers. Time and again throughout the
Cold War the United States will face serious conflicts with the communist world camp and will
respond with decisive, unilateral action to either defeat the Communist “enemies” or to at least
force them to stand down. Politically and constitutionally the U.S. presidency will manipulate
such events to its advantage, using the rhetoric of foreign crises to justify quick executive
response through either outright military intervention or covert, clandestine operations. As a
result, the presidency will emerge from the long years of the Cold War with a nearly established
precedent for unilateral military action in the face of foreign crises which only the president, as
Commander-in-Chief has the capacity to respond to quickly and effectively.
The United States Constitution empowers only the US Congress with the power to
declare a state of war. On the other hand, the Constitution declares that the president is the
Commander-in-Chief of armed forces. Therefore, when a state of war exists, the presidency has
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extraordinary wartime powers. What happens, however, if Congress does not have time to
deliberate and declare war, or if the country is preemptively attacked? This is the loophole
through which the Commander-in-chief increases his power throughout the Cold War. The Cold
War presented the United States with unique challenges to the conduct of military conflicts. The
United States has not declared a state of war since World War II, yet still the U.S. has been
involved in numerous “wars” since then: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and a
number of smaller interventions around the world. How is this possible? It is possible because
beginning with the Korean War, the U.S. presidency began to establish a precedent of unilateral
action, largely bypassing Congress, to conduct military operations that are not wars, but are yet
still justified as necessary defenses of America’s interests.
The unparalleled problems for foreign policy during the Cold War created a “menace of
unexpected crisis that hung over the world, demanding...the centralization of foreign policy in
the Presidency.”4 On June 24, 1950 Communist North Korea invaded South Korea, a nation
supported by the United States and its allies. Initially, President Truman made no commitment of
U.S. military forces, although both America and the United Nations had resolved to order a
withdrawal of North Korean forces. However, on June 27, 1950, the United Nations
recommended that member-states militarily assist South Korea. Truman then announced that “in
these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the [South] Korean
government troops cover and support.”5 Truman’s legal authority to act this way is nonexistent
for two reasons. First, Truman argued that the conflict in Korea was not a war, and that the
United States was pursuing a police action under the United Nations. However, the United
Nations exercised no real control over the conduct of the war and apart from token assistance
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provided by a few nations the ground war was conducted entirely by American troops. Second,
Truman did not seek Congressional approval for the military operations in Korea. Even if it was
to be agreed that the Korean conflict was not a war, then under the UN Participation Act
President Truman still required Congressional approval for special agreements that involved the
commitment of American troops to combat operations. Under the UN Participation Act the
president could only commit troops without Congressional approval if they served in a strictly
noncombatant capacity.6 In committing U.S. troops to the Korean War, Truman had violated the
commands of the Constitution and of a congressional statute.
Certainly, one would assume that once the war was over, a vengeful Congress would
reassert its constitutional role. This however, never occurred, Congress responded with
acquiescence and hardly a whimper of protest.7 The Korean War contributed to the growing
sentiment that the world was greatly endangered by the spread of the Communist bloc, and the
crisis mood that the nation was in put a strain on the conduct of foreign policy in regards to the
separation of powers in the federal government. From the 1950s on during the Cold War
American foreign policy demanded that the American government do things no previous
American government had done in terms of overseas interventions under the auspices of the
executive branch.8
The decades of the Cold War demonstrate the imperial presidency at its height. In the
years following the Korean War the best example of aggressive American foreign policy is the
Vietnam War, and this undeclared war is similarly carried out under the auspices of unilateral
presidential authority. American troops had been present in South Vietnam since the Eisenhower
administration in a purely advisory role. Again, the context of the Cold War justified the
6
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American presence as a necessary safeguard against a possible Communist takeover in Southeast
Asia at the hands of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. President Kennedy increased the
number of troops from 700 to 16,000. When President Lyndon Johnson succeeded to the
presidency, he was determined to escalate the conflict in Vietnam. According to the Johnson
administration, on August 2, 1964 North Vietnamese gunboats attacked a U.S. destroyer in the
Gulf of Tonkin.9 President Johnson ordered the navy to take retaliatory measures, and then again,
according to the administration, on August 4 a second attack occurred on two U.S. destroyers.
That night Johnson appeared on television, announcing to the American public that he had
ordered the navy to take retaliatory action and that the U.S. response would be “limited and
fitting,” and also that he “intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war.”10 Two days later, on
August 6, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The resolution essentially gave
Lyndon Johnson a blank check to wage a presidential war, approving and supporting “the
determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel
any armed attack against the forces of the United States.” The resolution was to expire when
“the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured.”11
Through this sweeping language the US Congress essentially surrendered its war power to the
executive, allowing President Johnson to escalate the conflict in Vietnam at his discretion. By
December 1965 the US troop deployment to Vietnam increased to 200,000 men. Johnson later
said of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that it was “like grandma’s nightgown; it covered
everything.”12
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The resolution was a political success for the administration and it did grant them a free
hand in turning up the heat of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Subsequent investigations of the
Gulf of Tonkin crisis cast a heavy shadow over the Johnson administration and its expansion of
executive war power. Certainly the first attack that occurred on August 2 by a lone North
Vietnamese gunboat on one U.S. navy destroyer was far too minor of an incident to justify a
Congressional resolution granting the president wide ranging powers to mobilize for military
action. Additionally, the second alleged attack on August 4 probably never happened –
conflicting accounts of the action have been given and the ship’s radar gives only inconclusive
evidence.13 Regardless of what truly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin, the “crisis” still had the
same effect – the American military machine was committed to an undeclared but growing war
in Indochina, and the war’s direction was to be determined by the presidency.
A notable characteristic of the imperial or Cold War-era presidency is its interventionist
foreign policy. Such aggressive foreign policy directed by the presidency has already been
described in the accounts of the Korean and Vietnam wars. Large-scale ground wars are not the
only examples of American Cold War interventions, however. During this era the United States
extensively used covert means to wage war against the Soviet Union and its perceived
sympathizers. Through clandestine operations waging from the supplying of insurgents to the
outright ousting of regimes in third-world countries, American muscle and economic power were
applied with finesse. Two textbook examples of such U.S. instigated coup d’états include the
1953 Iranian and 1954 Guatemalan coups, both of which were carried out during the Eisenhower
administration and largely executed by the CIA. Both coups were decided necessary because the
governments of Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran and President Arbenz of Guatemala were
deemed to be socialist and potential Soviet allies, despite being democratically elected
13
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governments. President Eisenhower was not shy in utilizing covert operations as a means of
combating the Soviet Union around the world.14 In the case of Iran, the Eisenhower
administration was primarily motivated by concern over the security of Iranian oil assets.
Mossadegh was planning to nationalize Iranian oil, and the U.S. and Great Britain began to plan
his to oust him from power. The Shah of Iran was returned to his country by the CIA after a short
exile, and Mossadegh was deposed, replaced, arrested and given a show trial. In the case of
Guatemala, the U.S. intelligence community decided that Arbenz’s land reform programs were
socialist in nature and suspected Soviet influence in his government. The CIA financed and
armed rebel Guatemalan armies, finding a leader for them in the person of Colonel Carlos
Armas. In June 1954 Armas’ forces invaded Guatemala, and supported by radio propaganda,
successfully created an impression of insurmountable odds arrayed against Arbenz. By the end of
June Arbenz had resigned. The success of these two coups encouraged the United States in
further clandestine operations. Between 1951 and 1975 it is estimated that the CIA engaged in
some nine hundred such interventions.15
The Iranian and Guatemalan coups should be alarming for two major reasons. First, both
regimes that were overthrown by U.S. pressure were democratically elected governments,
whether or not the U.S. approved of their reform policies. Secondly, both operations were
essentially presidential exercises in foreign regime change. In both cases, the executive branch
operated without Congress in planning, organizing, and executing the removal and replacement
of a foreign government. There is no constitutional basis for an American president having the
authority to determine whether or not a foreign government is legitimate or has the right to be in
power, and then follow up that determination by overthrowing that regime. This type of
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aggressive action is the direct product of a foreign policy that is centralized in an executive
branch which presides over the direction of a military superpower.
The eventual failure of the Vietnam War and the high price it bore left a bad taste for
military interventions in the mouths of the American public. Nevertheless, the Reagan
administration was able to order an American invasion of Grenada in 1983 and air strikes against
Libya in 1986. Eleven members of Congress went to court, claiming that Reagan had violated
the Constitu65tion, but they lost when the issue was held to no longer be relevant as the invasion
of Grenada had ended.16 The presidency of George H.W. Bush witnessed two exercises in
carrying out splendid little presidential wars: the invasion of Panama in 1989-1990 and the Gulf
War. When Congress was out of session in December 1989, President Bush ordered 11,000
troops to Panama to link up with 13,000 troops already present in the Canal Zone. President
Bush justified his action on the basis of the “imminent danger” to the American citizens present
represented by General Manuel Noriega’s regime. Bush also cited other justifications such as
defending democracy in Panama and combating drug trafficking. Noriega surrendered to the
United States January 3, 1990. Then, on February 7 of the same year, the House of
Representatives passed a resolution approving the president’s actions, declaring that he had acted
“decisively and appropriately in ordering U.S. forces to intervene in Panama.”17 Such a token
approval does not satisfy constitutional requirements; if thousands of American troops were
ordered overseas by the President of the United States to invade a foreign nation and overthrow
its sitting government it should only be following a prior Congressional declaration of war.
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The President Bush had a number
of reasons for desiring a quick war against Iraq. First, Kuwait’s oil supply needed to be
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safeguarded for American interests. Second, a quick victory over Hussein would assumedly
boost the president’s sagging political fortunes.18 President Bush’s administration refused to seek
to try to seek authority from Congress, and instead sought to “authorize” its war by building an
international coalition of allies including Saudi Arabia, France, and Britain, and through a UN
resolution authorizing member states to “use all necessary means” to force Iraqi troops out of
Kuwait. As Louis Fisher asks in his work Presidential War Power, “What role would Congress
have?”19 There is another overarching explanation that helps lend insight into the context of the
Gulf War. The Cold War ended in 1989, and the American “victory” in Panama strengthened
advocates of Bush’s “new world order” that would, in its essentials, equate to a world with only
the United States as the remaining superpower able to flex its military and economic muscle in
promoting American interests around the world. America’s Cold War-era leadership made the
Middle East its next target of imperialist ambition.20 Again, consistent with the Cold War-era,
presidential leadership was argued to be most suitable for conducting the inevitable quick
military interventions that policing the world would require.
Thus far, this essay has primarily covered the following topics: the enhancement of
presidential prestige and federal governing power during the FDR administration, and the Cold
War-era expansion of presidential war power. The combined effects of these developments
amount to what the author of this essay considers the imperial presidency. The main
characteristic of the foreign policy has been the arbitrary use of American military might in
interventionist adventures.21 Arguably, this Cold War-era leadership in foreign policy did not end
with the collapse of the Soviet Union or the electoral defeat of George H.W. Bush in 1992. After
18
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September 11, 2001, a sense of American vulnerability gave way to a 9/11 American mentality
that was at the same time unique and reminiscent of the Cold War.22 The War on Terror was
conducted on terms familiar to the United States which had survived World War II and the Cold
War: the good guys (America) vs. the bad guys (Terror); black and white; good and evil. This
mentality was equally suitable to the remnants of Cold War-era statesmen present in the
administration of George W. Bush, such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, all of whom were major
architects in the second Bush’s second Iraq War.23 It should come as no surprise that Bush’s
military response following the attacks of 9/11 did not come in the form of a Congressional
declaration of war, but instead in the form of a “resolution” that, again, typical of the imperial
presidency, authorized President Bush to use “all necessary action against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided” the 9/11
terrorists.24 The resolution granted Bush remarkable authority to conduct the War on Terror and
determine who counts as an enemy in that war.
Schlesinger says of the Cold War-era presidency, “The imperial presidency was
essentially the creation of foreign policy. A combination of doctrines and emotions – belief in
permanent and universal crisis, fear of communism, faith in the duty and right of the United
States to intervene swiftly in every part of the world – had brought about an unprecedented
centralization of decisions over war and peace in the presidency.”25 This essay has briefly
chronicled the development of the imperial presidency and its supremacy in the conduct of
American foreign relations, but the discussion does not end there. While the rhetoric of the Cold
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War and the War on Terror have justified in the name of democracy our country’s various
exercises in interventionism in places such as Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and Iraq, these foreign
escapades have actually often been conducted in the pursuit of less idealized interests such as
geopolitical and economic concerns. A history of the imperial presidency and its foreign policy
is most useful for exposing the flaws and abuses inherent in the centralization of power over war
and peace in the hands of the president. Such a history will show that the U.S. Congress, instead
of actively asserting its Constitutional prerogatives, has been largely submissive in allowing the
presidency to appropriate increased war powers.26
The current status and future of the imperial presidency are unclear. President George W.
Bush and his administration continued to operate within its framework in the War on Terror and
in the invasion of Iraq. With Bush’s departure from office, and the removal from power of the
final generation of Cold War leadership that persisted in the Bush administration, there is hope
that the Cold War-era imperialist presidency will give way to a presidential style more
appropriate to the increasingly multilateral and shrinking world. Thus far, President Barack
Obama’s foreign policy seems to be geared, at least in its rhetoric and diplomatic overtures,
towards turning away from the United States’ arbitrary, interventionist past. However, it is a
certainty that both the people and politicians of the United States still perceive our nation as the
world’s foremost superpower and share a nationalist desire to see America promote her interests
and values on the global stage, making an abandonment of the imperial presidency and its costly
interventionism much harder to accomplish. When will America decide to rid herself of the
burden of empire?
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